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Abstract
This paper discusses the various causal relations between unemploy-
ment and participation to the labor market, notably for groups with elastic
labor supply such as women. A flow model of labor market participation
is used to describe how various exogenous variations jointly aﬀect unem-
ployment and participation. Empirical tests based on time-series of OECD
countries are proposed. Notably, the model is used to determine short-run
identification restrictions of a structural VAR. It concludes that, in some
countries, fast rising female participation may have had a moderate short
and medium run impact on unemployment rates. A variance decomposi-
tion exercise indicates that, in Continental Europe, participation is driven
in the short run by unemployment shocks, while in the US, it is driven
by participation shocks, intepreted as demography or immigration. Un-
employment in Europe is driven in the short run by participation shocks
while in the US, it is driven by unemployment shocks.
1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to investigate the links between aggregate unem-
ployment and labor market participation, and notably causalities and the empir-
ical problems with testing those links. It uses the insights from a macroeconomic
model of labor market participation to illustrate the complex interactions be-
tween participation and unemployment and propose an empirical strategy, based
on structural VARs, to uncover those links.
∗I thank Alain Guay and Louis Phaneuf for discussions about structural VARs, the editor
and two anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions, Ha Dao Ngoc for eﬃcient
data collection and Simona Baldi of the FRDB for advice with Italian data. This paper was
started at the European Central Bank in Summer 2004 when the author was a Research Visi-
tor. Financial support from SSHRC is acknowledged. I also acknowledge insightful discussions
with Chris Pissarides about ten years ago, on the links between labor supply and unemploy-
ment. First submission: January 2005. A longer version of this text (CIRPÉE discussion
paper 06-15) is referred to in Section 3 and available on line (www.cirpee.org). JEL: J1, J6,
E24. Keywords: Unemployment, labor market participation, female participation.
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For a long time, labor supply shifts have been absent from empirical works
aiming at uncovering the determinants of unemployment. Recent work by Nick-
ell et al. (2005) focus instead on labor market institutions. Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000) focus on the interaction between institutions and various macro-
economic shocks but not labor supply shocks. However, in the pace of two
decades, the share of women in the active population has risen from 35% to
45% or more in most OECD economies ; the age composition has also dramat-
ically changed, with a younger population in the 1970’s and 80’s and an ageing
one in the 1990’s.
Recent works have shown that labor supply has a good potential at explain-
ing rising wage inequality in the US (Topel 1994a and b, Topel 1997, Kim and
Juhn 2000, Acemoglu 1999). Such issues had been investigated earlier (Hamer-
mesh and Grant 1979, Grant and Hamermesh 1982): estimate of production
functions with diﬀerent demographic groups show that there is no segmentation
of the labor force: an increase in the relative size of a group generates a neg-
ative eﬀects on the wage of q-substitute groups and a positive on the wage of
q-complement groups1. Is it possible that labor supply factors, causing more
wage inequality, can also cause more unemployment? This is at least plausible
if rigidities in the bottom of the wage distribution prevent downwards wage
adjustments.
However, the main diﬃculty in carrying time-series tests of the causal links
between labor supply and unemployment is an endogeneity issue, as unemploy-
ment might discourage female participation (as fewer jobs are available). In
contrast, added workers eﬀects, a mechanism through which a spouse may de-
cide to participate to the labour market if the primary wage earner is facing
unemployment risk, may generate a positive link between unemployment and
participation. There are broadly speaking two empirical strategies to deal with
these endogeneity issues. A first one, in the spirit of cross-country studies of
unemployment (Nickell et al. 2005, Nunziata 2003) is to regress unemployment
in panel on various institutions and female participation using with a set of
relevant instruments, such as divorce rate or the share of women in national
parliaments. Recent empirical works have recently estimated the determinants
of participation (Pissarides et al. 2005, Genre et al. 2003, Jaumotte 2004) ;
using those studies to implement an instrumental variable strategy is a promis-
ing research area. An alternative strategy, explored here, is to have recourse to
standard time-series techniques to uncover the double causality between partic-
ipation and unemployment. Notably, structural VAR techniques can illustrate
some of the relationships at work.
In Section 2, we expose some recent theoretical advances on the deter-
minants of participation and unemployment in a frictional market, based on
Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005). We briefly summarized the findings of the model,
and then introduce a few useful additions in our context: the participation rate
is made explicit, we develop some dynamics aspects and introduce a calibra-
1Groups i and j are q-substitute (resp. q-complement) when ∂ lnwi/∂ lnEj < 0 (resp.
>0) where Ej is the employment of group j and wi the wage of group i (see e.g. Hamermesh
1986).
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tion of Continental European economies. In Section 3, we also discuss various
causalities between unemployment and participation on a formal basis, which
was not in Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005).
This discussion is the basis for the development of an empirical methodol-
ogy in Section 4. It justifies the use of a SVAR approach to deal with bilateral
causalities. The model also has a second goal: it is to derive a proper identi-
fication of shocks in the empirical part. Generally speaking, our model would
potentially oﬀer two possibilities: the first one is to use the long-run relationship
between variables to obtain a long-run identification of shocks à la Blanchard
and Quah (1989). The second one is to calibrate the model for the US and a
few Continental European countries to fit with participation rates and unem-
ployment, so as to derive a short-run identification of shocks.
We have to chose one against the other, and our choice is exposed in that
section too. The long-run identification could indeed be derived from the model,
where a permanent shock on the distribution of utility of leisure has a long-
run impact on both participation and on the level of unemployment. This
arises because leisure has an impact on wages and thus on job creation and
quit decisions. This identification would imply that participation shocks have
a permanent eﬀect on unemployment. Even though this makes sense, it is as
odd with several macroeconomic models where participation shocks are neutral,
because they do not imply a compositional change of the labour force. The
issue of long-run neutral labor supply shocks in macroeconomic models was
discussed at length in Wasmer (1997) and some key aspects of the discussion
will be summarized in that section. In contrast, short-run identification is more
natural in a flow model: a shock on labor supply has a short-run impact on
unemployment, as time to search for a job is strictly positive.
Section 5 displays the results. In all countries, participation shocks have
had a moderate short and medium run impact on unemployment rates, while un-
employment shocks reduce participation during a few years. A variance decom-
position exercise indicates that, in Continental Europe, participation is driven in
the short run by unemployment shocks, while in the US, it is driven by partici-
pation shocks, interpreted as demography or immigration. Short-run unemploy-
ment is primarily driven by unemployment shocks in the US, but in Continental
Europe, participation shocks drive the short-run evolution of unemployment in-
stead. This result is obtained in a VAR with a linear trend: it does not imply
that participation is the major cause of rising unemployment in Europe, but
rather that employment has not positively co-moved with participation in these
countries. Section 6 concludes.
2 A theory of labor supply in imperfect labour
markets
It is not easy to build a theoretical model determining both unemployment and
endogenous participation to the labor market. In general, models of unemploy-
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ment have inelastic labor supply, while models of choice of hours have perfect
labor markets instead. Implicitly, the latter class of models assume that unem-
ployment and non-participation do not need to be disentangled. Nevertheless,
the empirical literature has recognized for long that in fact, non-participation
was distinct from unemployment: Flinn and Heckman (1983) have shown that
”unemployed” and ”out of the labor force” are behaviorally distinct states.
Notably, the determinants of the transition rate from unemployment to employ-
ment diﬀer largely from those of the transition rate from out of the labor force to
employment (table 1, p. 36). Recently, Jones and Ridell (1999) have shown on
Canadian data that the frontier between the two concepts was however diﬃcult
to draw, as there exists a significant margin of workers willing to have a job but
not actively searching. These are discouraged workers, or marginally attached
workers.
There are few models where one can straightforward analyze the joint re-
lations between unemployment and participation to the labor market and at
the same time account for the imprecision of the border between the diﬀerent
labour market states. We simplify here the exposition of the model by Garibaldi
and Wasmer (2005), GW hereafter.2 As explained above, the benchmark model
proposed here serves two goals. First, to discuss various causalities between
unemployment and participation on a sound basis, and second, to help deriv-
ing a short-run identification of supply shocks. For that, we will calibrate the
model to Europe and the US using institutional parameters such as the level of
unemployment benefits and taxes on wages.
2.1 Setup
In this model, workers are ex-ante homogenous (the assumption is relaxed in
the discussion of next section) but ex-post heterogenous. Notably, they have a
time-varying stochastic utility of non-participation, denoted by θ, which evolves
as a Poisson process with parameter μ drawing in a distribution with c.d.f. F (.).
The market productivity is y and is first assumed to be constant. Let us denote
by θq the reservation utility of leisure which makes workers indiﬀerent between
quitting and staying on the job, and by θν the reservation utility of leisure which
makes workers indiﬀerent between entering the labor market or staying out of
labor market participation.
Wages are assumed to be bargained between the employer and the employee:
workers’s share in the negotiation in denoted by β with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. There is
a tax τ on wages and workers derive utility during unemployment denoted by
b. Next, in a world with search frictions, the job seekers are recruited at a
Poisson rate α, made endogenous later on. When α < +∞, one can show that
θq is larger than θν : quitting is more diﬃcult than entering in the labor market,
2 In that paper, we focussed on macroeconomic and calibration issues on the US economies
and its labor flows in a steady-state. Here, we will develop and simplify the calculation of
the participation rate, oﬀer a simple comparative quantitative exercise of Europe and the US,
and develop a discussion of short-run dynamics of the model in response to a marginal supply
shock.
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because of a loss of search capital and surplus on the job. The labor supply
decisions are thus summarized by these two cut-oﬀ points, and accordingly we
can define
q = μ[1− F (θq)],
ε = μF (θν),
as respectively the quit rate to inactivity of employed workers and the entry rate
into the labor market of non-participants to the labor market. We established
in GW (2005) that such reservation rules exist and satisfy two equations,
Workers’ Entry:
θν − b
α
= β
θq − θν
r + μ+ δ
, (1)
Workers’ Quit : θq = y(1− τ) + μ
r + μ+ δ
Z θq
θν
F (θ)dθ. (2)
A simplified proof is derived in Appendix A. The quantity β θ
q−θν
r+μ+δ is the surplus
of a job for a marginal worker with utility of leisure θν .
These two equations have opposite slopes in the plan (θν , θq). The first
one is upward sloping and states that the opportunity cost of participating for
the marginally indiﬀerent worker is the expected forgone value of leisure as a
non-participant θν/α while the gain is b/α + β θ
q−θν
r+μ+δ . This implies that θ
ν is
increasing in θq as θq raises the surplus. It is also increasing in the exit rate
of unemployment α: this is a crucial link as it shows that at the entry margin,
participation to the labor market is reduced by a lower exit rate of job finding.
The second equation implies that θq is decreasing with θν , which can be seen
from a straightforward diﬀerentiation: as θν is larger, the surplus of staying on-
the-job is lower, and the gap between θq and y becomes smaller. This gap
is a hoarding term: the marginal quitter has home production above its wage,
because she looses her search capital, i.e. the value of past search eﬀorts.
2.2 Definition of stocks
Population size is normalized to one, and we have the following partition of the
population:
• for θ < θν , there are only labor market participants, both employed and
actively job seeker, i.e. unemployed according to the ILO.
• for θ > θq, there are only non-participants to the labor market.
• for completeness, between the two margins θν and θq, one finds the mar-
ginally attached workers. If they hold a job they don’t quit. Out of job,
they don’t want to search for a new job. They account for Jones and
Ridell (1999) marginally attached.
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Let us denote by uILO the ILO definition of the unemployment rate (only
counting workers below θν), and by pILO the implied definition of participation.
Calculations of the steady-state stocks in GW give the unemployment rate, while
the Appendix A gives the participation rate which was not in GW.
uILO =
δ + q
δ + q + α
, (3)
pILO =
ε
ε+ q +∆
. (4)
with ∆ = μ [F (θq)− F (θν)]
³
δ
δ+μ +
μ
δ+μ
δ+q
δ+q+α
´
> 0 is proportional to the num-
ber of marginally attached workers F (θq)− F (θν).3
We have therefore a first set of results. In the plane (θq, θν), an increase in α
shifts the entry curve upward and leaves the quit curve unchanged. It results an
increase in θν , and a decrease in θq, thus an increase in ε but also an increase in
q. The result on unemployment is a priori ambiguous but one can show that the
net eﬀect is always a reduction in unemployment. The result on participation
is ambiguous too, and can be either positive or negative, depending on whether
workers quit more than they enter.
2.3 General equilibrium
A third equation determines the job finding rate α. As is standard in the search-
matching literature, we assume an underlying matching technology associating
vacancies and unemployed workers. Let φ be the ratio of vacancies to unem-
ployment. We set α(φ) = φ1−η where 0 < η < 1, and let α(φ)/φ be the Poisson
rate at which firms recruit workers. A free-entry condition of firms states that
expected search costs must be equal to their share of the surplus. Let γ be the
flow vacancy cost of firms, then,
γ(1− τ) φ
α(φ)
= (1− β) θ
q − θν
r + μ+ δ
(5)
Vacancy costs γ multiplied by φ/α(φ) represent the expected value of recruit-
ment costs.
2.4 Calibration
We now proceed with a calibration of two stylized economies, Europe and the
US. The two economies with diﬀerent payroll taxes and replacement ratio of
unemployment benefits, aiming at representing Europe and the US. Table 1
gives the parameter values and the equilibrium.
3An issue is whether the latter population should be classified as active or inactive workers.
ILO is every clear about it: they should be considered as inactive workers. A less strict
definition of participation, that would include the marginally attached workers, actually leads
to a simpler expression for the participation rate ε/(ε+ q) > pILO , as explained in Appendix
A.
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Europe US
r: discount rate 0.005
μ: arrival rate of shocks to leisure 0.06
δ: exogenous job destruction rate 0.011
y: market productivity 2.0
Support: upper limit of leisure shocks 1.9
β: bargaining power of workers 0.5
η: elasticity of matching function 0.5
γ: flow recruitment cost of firms 3
τ : payroll taxes 0.4 0.3
b/y: unemployment benefits 0.5 0.25
Results
θν : entry cut-oﬀ point 1.16 1.31
θq: quit cut-oﬀ point 1.24 1.51
φ: labor market tightness 0.087 0.387
uILO: ILO unemployment rate 0.103 0.040
pILO: ILO participation rate 0.597 0.714
α: job finding rate 0.296 0.622
q = μ[1− F (θq)]: quit rate to inactivity 0.023 0.015
ε = μF (θν): entry rate into labor force 0.035 0.039
Table 1: Calibration statistics
All parameters, and notably productivity per worker y and the frequency μ
and distribution of family shocks f(.), are chosen so as to be identical for Europe
and the US. Parameter diﬀering across the two economy are the institutional
parameters: the ratio of unemployment benefits to productivity reproduces Cole
and Rogerson’s (1998) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) values for the US,
while I chose a conventional value for Europe. Payroll taxes are equal to 0.4
and 0.3 respectively. There were a few diﬀerences between this calibration and
the one in GW: if μ, r, β, η are identical to GW and have conventional values,
we chose here a uniform instead of a beta distribution, which implies slight
changes in productivity parameters, matching eﬃciency, recruitment costs γ
and exogenous job destruction rate (δ = 0.011 here and 0.01 in GW). We also
have added taxes and oﬀer a calibration of Europe where in GW we focussed
on the US only.
With these parameters, we obtain the following value of the unemployment
rate (4% in the US and 10.3% in Europe), corresponding to the average over
the 1990’s. One could argue that the latter is a bit high if compared to the
average in the whole European Union, but he have in mind the three largest
countries in continental Europe (Germany, France, and Italy) for which the
average unemployment is around 10. Participation rates (in the ILO sense)
correspond also well to average participation rates, 60% in Europe and 70% in
the US.
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As regards to flows in and out of activity, we only consider outflows from
employment (given that inflows into the labor force are then determined by the
stocks and the outflows). The comparability of data across country is prob-
lematic: in the US, monthly flow are aggregated into quarterly flows, while
in Europe, LFS data are based on yearly transitions, with typically a lot of
infra-yearly transitions problems. We match flows from employment to unem-
ployment relatively well, and tend to underestimate flows to inactivity in the
US with a better fit in Europe. Appendix B develops the discussion further,
and notably insist on data comparability issues.
2.5 Short-run dynamics: a special case
A full development of the dynamics in this model is diﬃcult, because we need to
keep track the time evolution of both all stocks and more diﬃcult, of the time-
varying distribution of θ within each stock, notably to determine the dynamic of
labor demand. This would require a development of the model that is beyond the
scope of the paper. Nevertheless, the short-run dynamics is useful to implement
a short-run identification. We will thus proceed as follows: first, consider a
steady-state as defined in the calibration above. To this steady state, assume
that an infinitesimal number of workers enters the labor force. Let us denote this
number by ξp for reasons clarified later on. This is a non-permanent increase
in labor supply. What is the dynamic evolution of the stock of unemployed
workers over a time horizon T?
In a constant labor supply world, the survival rate after s units of time
following the shock of these ξp additional participants is e−αs where α is the
outflow rate. But this is not the end of the story: here, those additional un-
employed workers remain in the labor force only as long as their value of home
productivity remains below θν : so, with intensity μ(1 − F (θν)), a fraction of
the unemployed also leave the unemployment pool.
Ignoring multiple transitions —that would lead to newly employed loosing
their job and add up to the unemployed pool and quitters to renter the labor
force again—, we thus obtain a formula for the increase in unemployment:
Result 1. The average number of additional unemployed workers over a
period of length T due to a one-shot increase in participation of ξp is
ξp
Ã
1
T
Z T
0
e−eαds
!
= ξp
µ
1− e−eαTeαT
¶
(6)
where eα = α+μ(1−F (θν)). In the US, μ(1−F (θν)) = 0.0136 and in Europe,
μ(1 − F (θν)) = 0.0146 so that the hazard rate is about 5% larger than α in
Europe and 2% larger than α in the US.
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3 The causal links from participation to unem-
ployment
3.1 Partial equilibrium: exogenous variation in α
Beyond the short-run, we can now use these two benchmark calibrations to
understand the long-run co-variations between unemployment and participation.
One major parameter aﬀecting participation is the job finding rate of workers
α. Variations in α would also aﬀect participation decisions, θν and θq, and
thus participation. The first exercise we carry out here is to impose exogenous
variations in α around its general equilibrium value denoted by α∗. We indeed
solve for the partial equilibrium values of θν and θq thanks to the quit and
entry margins, in a range [α∗/2 ; 3/2α∗]. One will thus see how much the
degree of frictions aﬀect the entry and the exit decisions in the two economies
calibrated above. Figure 1 represents the variation of α around α∗ = 0.622 for
the US. It shows that, the higher α, i.e. the more eﬃcient labor market from
the perspective of workers, the higher the entry rate and also the quit rate. The
intuition for a higher quit rate is easy: with higher α, the hoarding behavior of
workers is reduced as labor market is fluid. Overall, the quit eﬀect dominates
over the entry eﬀect and both unemployment and participation are reduced:
here, cov(uILO, pILO) > 0. In contrast, in a EU-type economy, represented
in Figure 2, where taxes and replacement ratio are higher, one observes that
the entry and the quit rates still rise with α, but that the entry eﬀect now
dominates: here cov(uILO, pILO) < 0. In other words, in a low participation
country, participation is raised by a more eﬃcient labor market, while in a high
participation country, participation can be reduced by a more eﬃcient labor
market. This suggests that, if the eﬀect of labor market conditions on labor
supply decisions of entry and exit are never ambiguous, they also have the
opposite consequences on stocks of participation and thus ambiguous eﬀects.
3.2 General equilibrium variations in α
We can now investigate whether there are positive or negative covariations be-
tween unemployment and participation when changes in α are driven by changes
in productivity or benefits. We do not report simulations of the general equi-
librium impact of a change in productivity y but briefly described them: in
both a European-type and US-type economy, an increase in y always reduces
quits and raise entries. This simultaneously increase participation and reduces
unemployment.
The general equilibrium impact of unemployment benefits is as follows.
When the replacement ratio goes from 0.5 to 0.25, the job finding rate α in-
creases from 0.4 to 0.63. The intuition is simple. As b declines, wages pressure
is lower, so are wages, and jobs become generate higher profits for firms. This
shifts the entry of firms up, and raise vacancy openings and thus the job find-
ing rate α. Unemployment thus declines. On participation margins (quits and
entries), we have the following results: the decline in b and the resulting higher
9
Figure 1: Partial equilibrium. United States. X-axis is α. Impact of an
exogenous change in α on unemployment, participation, quit and entry. Vertical
line is the general equilibrium value of the job finding rate. τ = 0.3, b/y = 0.25.
Figure 2: Partial equilibrium: Europe. X-axis is α. Impact of an exogenous
change in α on unemployment, participation, quit and entry. Vertical line is the
general equilibrium value of the job finding rate. τ = 0.4, b/y = 0.5.
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α leads to a decline of quits because of the reduction of the hoarding eﬀect: in
a more eﬃcient labour market, entry and exit decisions (θq and θν are closer
to each other) and so the gap between wage and reservation home production.
On the other hand, lower b leads to a negative eﬀect on entries into the (as par-
ticipation yields higher income from benefits) and quit since the value of a job
relative to non-employment decreases. Overall, participation declines because
the disincentive eﬀect on quits dominates.
3.3 Additional eﬀects
3.3.1 Aggregate eﬀects
We first keep the assumption of homogenous labor but relax the assumption that
y is constant and exogenous. It could be that the level of aggregate employment
has a negative impact on the marginal revenue of the firm. Such would be the
case if, along a demand curve, a rise in quantity produced lead to a reduction
in prices of goods. In a reduced form, one can assume that y = F (E) where
E is aggregate employment with F 0 > 0, and F 00 < 0.4 Thus, given that
E = p(1− uILO), participation has a negative impact on y ceteris paribus.5
Such a phenomenon is plausible in the short-run when the stock of capital
is fixed. In the long-run, the assumption of constant returns to scale is more
appealing. This reasoning suggest the existence of a link between the first
diﬀerence of participation and the first diﬀerence of unemployment, which is
negative along this productivity (labor demand) curve.
Result 2. In the long-run, one should expect no link between participation
and unemployment, because of the homogeneity of labor supply.
3.3.2 Distributional eﬀects
However, changes in labor supply are not homogenous. Assume that there are
two segments of the labor force, say female workers and workers substitute to
women (young workers, unskilled prime age men6). An increase in the level of
4This eﬀect can easily be generated in assuming that all goods produced by workers are
intermediate goods sold in a competitive market to a final good sector with decreasing returns
to scale. The price of each intermediate good thus declines with employment. As a conse-
quence, the marginal revenue of labor declines with aggregate employment. Formally, this is
equivalent to having y declining with E.
5As pointed out by a referee, the conventional bargaining solution no longer applies when
there are decreasing returns to scale, as first developped by Stole and Zwiebel (1996). They call
the new solution for wages intrafirm bargaining. Cahuc, Marque and Wasmer (2004) showed
that in search context, the marginal product is weighted by a term depending on bargaining
power and technological parameters such as the gap to constant returns to scale (one labour
type) or substituability between groups of labour (several labour types), resulting into over or
under employment of some groups compared to the conventional wage solution. Unreported
calculations however indicate that qualitative results are the same as in the benchmark search
models, the diﬀerence beeing only quantitative.
6 See the early empirical estimates of production function (Grant and Hamermesh 1982,
Hamermesh and Grant 1979, Becker 1983) who find this pattern of substitutability.
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employment of female workers (denote them with superscript f) may be detri-
mental to labor market prospects of those substitute workers (denote them by
superscript σ). Since by definition, ∂2F/∂eσ∂ef is negative, yσ(ef ) is negatively
sloped, one may expect a positive relation between unemployment of group σ
and female participation. Works by Topel (1994a and b, 1997) indicate that q-
substituabilty exists between unskilled men (below 33th centile) and unskilled
women (below median), but also between high skill women (above median) and
low skill men.
Along similar lines but in imperfect labor markets, one can imagine in a
reduced form the existence of crowding-out in the labor market for substitute
workers. Then, ασ(pf ) could be negatively sloped if employers prefer women
to young workers at the hiring level, independently of (or more precisely, in
addition to) the productivity eﬀects described above. Similarly, rising female
participation may lead to displacement of σ-workers.
Result 3. In the short-run, a change in the composition of the labor force
due higher participation of a group may raise unemployment above the level
implied by identity 6.
Denote by Λ this additional fraction, which depends on the second cross-
derivative of production with respect to labor groups and is thus unobserved.
The knowledge of Λ or at least a prior on its value is required in order to estimate
the impact of rising female participation. In the text below, we will describe a
procedure to infer about its value.
Whether Result 2 or Result 3 holds depends on the type of the shock and
can be tested.
4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Separating u(p) and p(u)
The toolbox of econometric analysis allows for several strategies, each of which
being specific to the type of empirical relation one wishes to uncover. In a cross-
section of countries, if one is interested in the causal impact of participation, one
can use standard 2SLS-3SLS estimation problem with the hope of finding ap-
propriate instruments to determine labor market participation. Since variations
in participation, both cross-country in time are too a large extent driven by
female participation, the discussion that follows is based on finding instruments
for female participation. See e.g. Wasmer (1997) for an early discussion of such
instruments (divorce rate, the fraction of female in National Parliaments) and
an illustration, and the recent works of Jaumotte (2003), Genre et al. (2004)
and Pissarides et al. (2005) for far more detailed studies of the determinants of
female participation. Notably, Jaumotte (2003) shows that marginal tax rates
of second earner are one of the significant determinant of female activity rates.
Other works indicates that the religion and church attendance tend to aﬀect
the aggregate share of women in the labor force (Algan and Cahuc, 2004) while
Pissarides et al. (2005) find little eﬀect of religion but an important role of
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startup costs.
If one is concerned by investigating causal links for a given country, one needs
to deal with VAR and cointegration analysis and test Granger non-causality in
using the lag structure. This is what we shall do now.
4.2 Methodology
Let pt and ut the two times series we consider and Xt = (pt, ut)
0. We estimate
the following VAR system:
Xt = D(L)Xt−1 + Zt + εt (7)
where D(L) is a matrix of lags, Zt is a set of additional controls (trends and
constants) and εt = (ε
p
t , εut )
0 a vector of residuals. We then adopt the structural
VAR approach and decompose εt into white noise structural innovation ut, i.e.
εt = Cξt
where C is a 2x2 matrix. Result 2 above on the absence of a long-run impact of
labor supply on unemployment could be used as an identification restriction, in
the spirit of Blanchard and Quah (1989). They investigated the eﬀect of technol-
ogy and demand shocks in a bivariate VAR in assuming the absence of long-run
impact of demand shocks on output and unemployment. We do not chose this
road here, because, as argued in result 3, changes in the composition of the labor
force, having aﬀected the labor markets over more than three decades, can have
a long-run impact given the relatively small sample (45 to 48 years) used. We
thus restrict our analysis to short-run identification restrictions. The issue here
is to disentangle structural shocks leading to a negative covariation between
unemployment and participation (such as productivity shocks, demand shocks)
and structural shocks leading to a negative covariation between unemployment
and participation (such as shocks on the incentive to participate, such as the
θ0s).
Without loss of generality, we can write
εpt = Cppξ
p
t − Cpuξut (8)
εut = Cupξ
p
t + Cuuξ
u
t
where we expect all constants Cij to be positive for i = p, u.
4.3 Structural identification
Given that the variance-covariance matrix εtε0t is obtained from the data, this
imposes three restrictions on Cij . We can thus only chose one coeﬃcient, but
oﬀ-diagonal terms can be identified from theoretical reasoning.
Indeed, the interpretation of Cup is how much unemployment will result from
a structural innovation in participation. Having a prior on this coeﬃcient is eas-
ier. In most countries, a fraction χ of the flows from non-participation to partic-
ipation occur through unemployment, the complement 1− χ being direct flows
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into employment. In practice, χ is close to 0.5 in many countries. As argued in
Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005), a part of direct flows from non-participation to
employment (NE) is actually due to undetected infra-marginal transitions not
detected by statisticians. An innovation ξp implies ∆L = ξpP15−64 additional
participants, a fraction 1 − χ of them are directly employed. The NU flows
(from non-participation to unemployment) is composed of the χ∆L.7 To com-
pute the average increase in unemployment rate over a year, we use equation
(6) with the quarterly value of α implied by the calibration. This implies that
in that equation, T = 4. So, overall, taking for ∆U an average of the increase
in unemployment at the time of the shock and one year after, we have that
∆U = ξpP15−64χ( 1−e
−eαTeαT ) so that
Cup =
χ
p
µ
1− e−4eα
4eα
¶
(9)
The interpretation of Cpu is the decline in participation when labor market
conditions worsen, an eﬀect known as the ”flexion eﬀect”. We argue that for each
increase in the number of unemployed worker ∆U due to a structural innovation
in ξut , a number δ∆U of labor market participant return to inactivity. The
parameter δ reflects an underlying labor supply curve for female workers, but
where the determinant of participation rate is the rate of unemployment instead
of the wage as in a standard labor supply curve. Thus, εp = −δ∆U/P15−64
where P15−64 is the 15-64 year old female population and ∆U = ξu(L+ ξu) =
ξuL ignoring second order terms where L is total active population. We have
thus
Cpu = δp (10)
There is however little knowledge about the dependence of participation to
unemployment reflected in δ.
So, at this stage, one needs to make a choice about which restriction to
impose, Cup or Cpu. Given that the labor supply parameter δ is unknown, we
chose to impose a short-run restriction on Cup and recover Cpu from the data,
which then allows us to obtain an estimate for the value of δ.
Note also that so far, we assumed that u referred to total unemployment
rate and p referred to total participation rate. However, the methodology for
the structural identification can be adapted to diﬀerent specifications. Denote
by Lf the number of female participants and by ωf the share of women in
the labor force, L = Lf/ωf . If we replace p by pf in the VAR, we have to
replace p by pf/ωf in equations (9)-(10), at least to the extent that no male
job is displaced after an increase in female participation. If in addition, for each
7 In GW (2005) we defended the view that a large part of observed NE flows is due to
a statistical illusion, and decided to build a model where they should not be here. In this
“purist interpretation”, χ must be close to 1 instead. A positive value accounts for other
interpretations of NE flows (I thank a referee for raising the point), such as the “jobs bump
into people” mechanism also discussed in GW (2005). Being agnostic on that, I re-run the
exercise with various values of χ ranging from 0.25 to 0.75 and found the same qualitative
results, with quantitative changes, except for Italy, as discussed below.
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Average 1956-2003 US Fra Ger Ita
Unemployment rate u 5.73 6.18 4.48 8.20
Participation rate p 61.3 56.2 57.5 61.0
Female participation rate pf 47.7(a) 42.5 42.6 40.1(b)
Share of female workers in labor force ωf 39.7 39.4 39.1 33.4(c)
Average 1995-2003
Unemployment rate u 4.85(d) 10.52 8.66 10.6
Participation rate p 65.3 55.3 57.1 60.6
Female participation rate pf 58.2 48.4 48.2 45.9
Share of female workers in labor force ωf 45.9 45.5 43.5 37.9
(a ) : 1 9 5 6 -2 0 0 2 ; ( b ) : 1 9 5 9 -2 0 0 3 ; ( c ) : 1 9 5 8 -2 0 0 2 ; ( d ) : 1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 2
Table 2: Sample statistics
additional female participant, there are Λ male workers displaced, we need to
replace, in the same equations, p by pf (1 + Λ)/ωf . Following Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) in a similar exercise, we compute Cup from the average value of
pf and ωf over the sample, and, in unreported robustness checks, use instead
the extreme values pf/ωf over three sub-periods without qualitative change.
5 Estimation and results
5.1 Data
We use time series data of the OECD Labor Force Statistics between 1956 and
2002. See Appendix B for a brief description. Data are yearly. Quarterly data
are available since the early 90’s, but as a first pass, we investigate only the
longer-run data at the loss of higher frequency. Figure 3 displays the statistics
for four countries. Table 2 shows the sample average of unemployment rates,
participation rates and shares ωf for the four countries of the study, in percent.
5.2 Specification and specification tests
Since we are in what follows interested in the estimation of some coeﬃcients and
short- and medium-run impulse response function, the question about whether
the initial series are I(1) is not very important here (Sims et al. 1990). We
decided to estimate equation (7) with a trend. A second specification choice
involves the number of lags. We run the regression with one, two or three lags.
It is only in the last case that all the autocorrelation of the residuals disappear.
The larger the number of lags, the larger the number of parameters to estimate,
so that the baseline specification has thus a trend and three lags.8
8 I carried out formal tests such as the sequential modified likelihood ratio (LR) that the
lth lag is jointly zero. Depending on specifications and the criteria (Aike, Schwarz, Hanna-
Quinn), the number of lags suggested was 2 or 3 (for most specifications) and in a few cases,
4. When this occured, this was not uniform result across criteria, and other criteria gave 2 or
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Figure 3: Total and female participation rates (left-axis, % of 15-64 population)
and unemployment rates (right-axis, % of labor force).
16
The table in Appendix C reports some additional statistics of the VAR
estimates. In general, the roots of the system are in the unity circle and usually
below 0.90: the first line for each specification reports the highest modulus of
the roots of the characteristic polynomial. The two figures in Appendix C also
indicate the position within the circle of all roots. The second line report the
covariance matrix of the estimated residuals. The third line tests for the presence
of autocorrelation at the forth or fifth order. It appears that, for specification
1, residual autocorrelation subsists only for Italy. For specification II, there
remains some autocorrelation at order 4 for the US, France and Italy.9
5.3 Identification of the shocks
Then, we proceed with the identification of the structural shocks and the im-
pulse response based on Cup, based on the calculations of equation (9) and on
sample averages in table (2). The value of χ is 0.5 for all countries and both
specifications, except for Italy in specification I, for reasons made explicit below.
In the first specification X = (p, u)0, we use the sample average of p and the
calibrated value of eα is 0.636 for the US-style economy and 0.311 for Continental
European countries. In Table 3, the first line provides the country value of the
short-run restriction Cup which ranges from 0.296 in the US to 0.510 in France.
The second line uses the information on the variance-covariance matrix of ε to
obtain the implied value of Cpu knowing Cup and the standard error. The third
line uses equation (10) to obtain the implied value of δ and a standard error.
Given the structure of residuals of the VAR, this leads to the estimates of
Cpu to the second line (s.e. in parentheses), between 0.206 for both France and
the US to 0.498 for Italy. Italy is a specific case: with χ = 0.5, the implied value
of Cup would be 0.469. However, given the residuals of the VAR, it is impossible
to invert the system (8) for values of Cup above 0.450 in Italy: the s.e. goes to
infinity. A possible interpretation is that there are many NE flows in Italy due
to inactivity being disguised shadow activity (Boeri and Garibaldi 2003). This
should reduce χ and thus Cup. There is no way to have a better guess on χ
because generally speaking, EN flows are noisy, subject to various statistical
and theoretical interpretations as discussed in footnote 7. We take an agnostic
view instead and propose to reduce χ to 0.4. To check the importance of this
ad hoc assumption, the last column proposes an alternative specification with
χ = 0.3 with no qualitative implication on impulse response.
The implied value of δ (i.e., the number of participants leaving the labor
force for each additional unemployed worker) is 0.34 in the US., a bit higher in
France (0.37), larger in Germany and much larger in Italy (0.88). Note however
3. We thus set the number of lags to 3.
9For specification I, the inspection of the autocorrelogram shows that this is due to a large
negative residual of the participation series in 1993. For specification II, a similar negative
residual in 1993 is involved for Italy. For all countries, we checked that autocorrelations
between leads and lags of residuals are always within two standard error bounds. This is
indeed the case, except in one of the twelve checked lags for Italy, again due to year 1993. To
remove this 4th order autocorrelation, we would have to increase the number of lags to four,
at some eﬃciency cost.
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US Fra Ger Ita Ita (2)
Specification I: X = (p, u)0 (χ = 0.5) (χ = 0.4) (χ = 0.3)
Restriction for Cup(new) 0.296 0.510 0.498 0.375 0.282
Estimated value of Cpu
0.206
(0.061)
0.206
(0.024)
0.383
(0.066)
0.535
(0.073)
0.451
(0.078)
Implied value of δ 0.34
(0.10)
0.37
(0.04)
0.67
(0.09)
0.88
(0.12)
0.74
(0.13)
Specification II: X = (pf , u)0 (χ = 0.5)
Restriction for Cup 0.226 0.398 0.394 0.358
Estimated value of Cpu
0.166
(0.069)
0.117
(0.031)
0.330
(0.079)
0.565
(0.101)
Implied value of δ 0.14
(0.06)
0.11
(0.03)
0.30
(0.07)
0.47
(0.08)
Table 3: Identification restrictions
that given the standard error (0.09 in Germany and 0.12 in Italy), the diﬀerence
between the two countries is not significant: δ could be below 0.76 in Italy with
good probability. In fact, the high values of δ for these two countries is consistent
with Figure 3 where total participation rates appear to be much more cyclical,
and also consistent with the view that female workers in Germany and Italy
have historically played, to a greater extent, a role of buﬀer to absorb labor
demand shocks.10
This is what specification II aims at testing, in estimating a VAR with
the vector X = (pf , u)0. We have to adjust some parameters of the previous
exercise. First, as argued above, we replace p by pf/ωf . Second, we need to
have an estimate of how many workers (the parameter Λ) are displaced after an
innovation in the number of female participants. In the absence of knowledge,
we proceed as follows. We are going to estimate it from the US series, with
the following additional identification assumption: we expect δ for the US in
specification II to be about half of δ in specification I. Indeed, δ in specification
II is the total number of female workers leaving the labor force after a change
in the ξu – which is an increase in total unemployment. This implies that Λ is
slightly above 0.5 but we round it to Λ = 0.5. We then assume that Λ takes the
same value in the three other countries and recover the values of Cpu from the
residuals and subsequently of δ. It appears that δ is relatively small for France
but larger in Germany and Italy. As a robustness check, other regressions were
run, adjusting the hiring rate α for women to lower values. Unreported results
show that reducing α by 50% does not aﬀect the value of δ by more than 2 or
3 percentage points and leave impulse response qualitatively unchanged.
10Note that χ = 0.3 reduces further δ in Italy, which probably means that indeed χ must
be lower than 0.5.
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5.4 Impulse responses
Figure 4 displays the oﬀ-diagonal impulse response for a one standard devia-
tion innovation and the confidence interval with two standard errors.11 The
first column of charts indicate that a positive unemployment shocks leads to a
medium run decline in participation in the US (4 years) or Germany (6 years).
The degree of persistence is larger in Italy and especially in France. The reverse
causality, i.e. the response of unemployment to participation shocks, is in the
second column of charts. It indicates that participation shocks appear to be
rather persistent, except in Germany. The reason is that participation adjusts
downwards rather fast, consistently with the estimates of δ above. Such is not
the case in Italy, because of a higher persistence of the unemployment series.
Finally, both France and the US exhibit significant persistence in unemployment
after an innovation ξu, but the magnitude of the impact in France is twice as
large after two or three years. Figure 5 represents the result of the same exercise
for specification II, i.e. replacing p by pf . Qualitatively, the results (variations
and persistence) are the same as for specification I.
Interestingly, in both specifications, the confidence intervals always include
zero in the long run. This allows for a further conclusion: Result 3 (long-
run impact of heterogenous labor supply shocks) is not consistent with the
data, while Result 2 (no-long run impact of homogenous labor supply shocks)
is consistent with the data.
5.5 Variance decomposition
Before discussing cross-country diﬀerences, we carry another exercise, the vari-
ance decomposition for each series. This is reported for each specification in
Tables 4 and 5. The variance decomposition for years after year 5 is not very
informative, as most of the impact is no significantly diﬀerent from 0, so we
mostly focus the discussion on the first years after the shock. As shown in
Table 4, in year 2 for instance, unemployment is mostly determined by partici-
pation shocks in Europe in the short run (70% for Germany, 50% for Italy, 93%
in France), and much less (16%) in the US. This amounts to saying that total
employment does not absorb the labor supply shocks in the short run in Europe,
while in the US the opposite happened. A similar US-Europe divide appears for
the participation series: unemployment shocks in year 2 determine the largest
share of participation (98% in France, 83% in Germany and 95% in Italy), while
it is only 24.5% in the US. Similar conclusions emerge when inspecting Table
5 for female participation. This suggests that participation changes in the US
were driven by migration or demographic changes, while in Continental Europe,
labor supply reacted more to economic conditions. As already stressed in intro-
duction, the specification includes a country-specific trend, so that these results
11 Inspection of on-diagonal terms, that is, the response of unemployment to innovations
ξu or participation to innovations ξp indicate that shocks are not persistent in Germany,
participation shocks are persistent in the US and in France, but there, zero is in the confidence
band. In Italy, the confidence interval include 0 after 2 to 4 years in Italy. The on-diagonal
terms are available upon request.
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Figure 4: Response to one standard deviation structural innovation and +/- 2
standard errors confidence interval. Left charts: response of total participation
rates to a structural innovation on total unemployment ξu. Right charts: re-
sponse of total unemployment rates to a structural innovation on participation
ξp.
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standard errors confidence intervals. Left charts: response of female participa-
tion rates to a structural innovation on total unemployment ξu. Right charts:
response of total unemployment rates to a structural innovation on female par-
ticipation ξp
f
.
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Usa Fra Ger Ita
Series p p p p
Shock ξp ξu ξp ξu ξp ξu ξp ξu
Year 1 75.5 24.5 0.07 99.9 25.4 74.6 8.98 91.0
Year 2 70.9 29.1 2.27 97.7 17.0 83.0 4.83 95.2
Year 5 79.0 21.0 14.4 85.6 12.8 87.2 3.27 96.7
Year 10 80.2 19.8 52.7 47.3 28.5 71.5 3.11 96.9
Series u u u u
Shock ξp ξu ξp ξu ξp ξu ξp ξu
Year 1 12.1 87.9 96.0 4.04 70.1 29.9 73.3 26.7
Year 2 16.3 83.7 93.0 7.00 67.8 32.2 50.5 49.5
Year 5 40.9 59.1 94.2 5.78 69.5 30.5 23.5 76.5
Year 10 40.0 60.0 94.6 5.45 63.3 36.7 19.8 80.2
N o t e : d u e t o r o u n d in g e r r o r s , t h e s um o f va r ia n c e s i s n o t n e c e s s a r i ly 1 0 0%
Table 4: Variance decomposition, total participation and total unemployment
do not imply that participation is the major cause of unemployment, but sim-
ply that in the short-medium run, employment does not react to participation
shocks in Europe.
6 Conclusion
This paper is concerned by causal links between unemployment rates and par-
ticipation rates. A theoretical model allows to understand the causality from
unemployment to participation decisions, and more precisely, from the job find-
ing rate to the entry decision of workers. We then discuss the issue of opposite
causality, and attempt to identify structural innovations of participation in the
data and their impact on unemployment. Overall, results indicate a mild and
significant positive impact of total participation and female participation on
unemployment in the short and medium run, in a horizon of five to eight years
depending on countries.
We also find diﬀerences across countries: in Continental Europe, partici-
pation react more to unemployment which itself determines a higher share of
unemployment variations in the short-run. A possible explanation is European
Malthusianism: first, there are social pressures to reduce labor supply when un-
employment increases, and second, employment is stable and insensitive to pure
labor supply shocks. In the US, shocks to labor supply are more important, due
to immigration and demography: employment reacts fairly well to these shocks,
and fluctuations of unemployment are driven by other shocks (demand or tech-
nology). Conversely, an increase in unemployment in the US is not followed by
Malthusian pressures, and so little of the fluctuations of participation are drive
by unemployment.
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Usa Fra Ger Ita
Series pf pf pf pf
Shock ξp
f
ξu ξp
f
ξu ξp
f
ξu ξp
f
ξu
Year 1 86.7 13.3 30.9 69.1 41.9 58.1 7.08 92.9
Year 2 83.9 16.1 32.8 67.2 31.5 68.5 6.19 93.8
Year 5 90.5 9.46 36.5 63.5 27.6 72.4 4.75 95.2
Year 10 87.8 12.2 27.3 72.7 37.1 62.9 4.94 95.1
Series u u u u
Shock ξp
f
ξu ξp
f
ξu ξp
f
ξu ξp
f
ξu
Year 1 7.25 92.7 84.5 15.2 58.6 41.4 88.9 11.1
Year 2 11.2 88.8 79.5 20.5 56.3 43.7 67.8 32.2
Year 5 40.6 59.4 85.4 14.6 61.5 38.5 45.9 54.1
Year 10 49.0 51.0 73.9 26.1 60.9 39.1 45.6 54.4
N o t e : d u e t o r o u n d in g e r r o r s , t h e s um o f va r ia n c e s i s n o t n e c e s s a r i ly 1 0 0%
Table 5: Variance decomposition, female participation and total unemployment
Future research should aim at disentangling the diﬀerential impact of male
and female participation shocks: an interesting extension would be to estimate
a tri-variate VAR with (pm, pf , u): the interest is to allow for a larger range
of short-run eﬀects, like the diﬀerential response of male and female participa-
tion to unemployment innovations, or the response of female participation to
innovation in male participation and reciprocally. The cost is to have to impose
more identification restrictions and notably the impact of a shock on female
participation to male unemployment. Preliminary results for the US however
suggests that, even when one imposes the same short-run impact on unemploy-
ment of innovations in participation, female participation raise unemployment
for a longer period while innovations in male participation exhibit no persistent
impact on unemployment. Additional complexities arise for other countries, as
the unit root of the characteristic polynomial seem closer to 1.
Another extension is to explore further the role of participation shocks in
macroeconomics. So far, our unemployment shock is a combination of demand
and technology. The debate launched by Galí (1999) might be enlighted by
adding a new source of unemployment fluctuations. Although our results are
suggestive that the results for the US might not be aﬀected much by participa-
tion, the converse may hold in Continental Europe.
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Appendix
A Derivation of the model
The proof follows GW (2005). Let W (θ), U(θ) and H(θ) be the asset values of workers
with home productivity θ. We have, assuming that only non-participants enjoy home
production:
(r + μ)W = w(θ)(1− τ) + μ
Z θmax
θmin
max (W 0,H0) dF (θ0) (A1)
+δ[max (U,H)−W ],
(r + μ)U = b+ μ
Z θmax
θmin
max (U 0, H0) dF (θ0) (A2)
+α[ max (W,U)− U ],
(r + μ)H = θ + μ
Z θmax
θmin
max (U 0,H0) dF (θ0). (A3)
We have: W (θq) = H(θq) and U(θν) = H(θν), and further, U is a constant of θ,
as well as W when θ < θν . This leads to
θν = α(W − U)(θν) (A4)
θq = w(θq) + μ
Z θq
θmin
[W 0 −max(U 0,H0)] dF (θ0) (A5)
Let J be the value of a job for a firm in a free-entry world where the value of a job
vacancy is zero in equilibrium. Then, if wages are bargained so as to conventionally
share the total surplus J +W 0 −max(U 0, H0)in shares β and 1− β, we obtain
J = (1− β) θ
q − θν
r + μ+ δ
(A6)
w(θq) = (1− β)θq + βy(1− τ) (A7)
and replacing the equations (A6) and (A7) into (A4) and (A5) we obtain the three
main equations (2), (1) and (5) in the text.
Participation rate is calculated from stock-flows equation in a steady-state, and
follow Garibaldi and Wasmer (2003):
1− pILO
pILO
=
1
μF (θν)
½
(μ− μF (θν) + α)u− (1− u) δ
δ + μ
[δ + q + μF (θν)]
¾
(A8)
The latter expression is a bit complex, but can be simplified if we introduce the
notations ε = μF (θν) and z = μ [F (θq)− F (θν)]. Indeed, notice that μ − μF (θν) =
q+z and δ+q+μF (θν) = δ+μ−z. We can rewrite the expression above in as the sum
of two terms, the first one being q/ε and the second term being a more complicated
expression.
1− pILO
pILO
=
q
ε
+
1
ε
½
(z + α)u− (1− u)(q + δ(1− z
δ + μ
))
¾
We now add to GW (2005) the following trick. Define by pl a more ”liberal” notion of
participation including the marginally attached workers who do not have a job. This
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quantity has a simple expression: indeed, realizing that ∂pl/∂t = ε(1 − pl) + qpl, we
obtain the steady-state level of pl as
pl =
ε
ε+ q
, (A9)
The diﬀerence between pILO and pl is thus of the order of magnitude of (θq − θν).
It follows that, to the extent that θq and θν are close to each others, the diﬀerence
between pl and pILO is small, as numerical exercises below also indicate. Further,
both participation rates pl and pILO converge to the neo-classical participation rate
p∗ = F (y) when θq − θν → 0. Now, since we know that pl and pILO diﬀer only by the
number of marginally unattached workers which is proportional to z, we can anticipate
that we can simplify. Indeed, noticing that αu = (q + δ)(1− u), we have
1− pILO
pILO
=
q
ε
+
1
ε
½
zu+ (1− u) δz
δ + μ
)
¾
=
q
ε
+
z
ε
½
δ
δ + μ
+
μ
δ + μ
u
¾
and we thus obtain the equation (4) derived in the text. Note that in the calibration
exercise reported in the text, the value of pl for Europe and the US is respectively
0.603 and 0.728. Both are indeed very close from pILO.
B Data description
Participation rates and unemployment rates are released by the OECD (Corporate
Data Environment, Labor Force Statistics (part 3), http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/default.asp,
for all countries. Longest time series start in 1956 and end in 2003. Data for Ger-
many include a structural break in 1991 at the time of reunification. Data for Italy
have a structural break in 1993 at a time of a change in the design of the labor force
survey and in the definition of unemployment. In addition, participation rates are not
available between 1972 and 1976. It appears that total and female civilian population
is indeed available, but the denominator of participation rates (the 15-64 population
data) is not. The 15-64 Italian population was thus fitted for those years by interpo-
lation and I reconstructed consistent time series of participation date. Regressions for
Germany include a dummy variable D91=(year≥1991), and regressions data for Italy
include two dummy variables, D93=(year≥1993) and D7276=(1972≥year≥1976).
As regards to transition rates discussed in the calibration exercise, Auer and Cazes
(2000) indicate, using LFS data that in France and Germany, the transition rate from
employment to inactivity (en) over the period 1992-99 is roughly 4% a quarter, i.e.
1% a quarter, to which one should add regular retirement (an additional 0.5 to 0.7%
a quarter), while the transition rate from employment to unemployment (eu) is about
1% a quarter . In Italy, the same authors find a similar en rate, 1% a quarter, and a
much lower eu rate, about 0.5% a quarter. Nonetheless, Boeri and Garibaldi (2002),
extend the traditional flows analysis to the shadow sector: they show in their Table
4 that flows from employment to shadow unemployment are as high as regular eu
flows in the South, and about 40% of that flow in the North. Overall, the actual en
flow rate in the three Continental European countries is 1%, to which we add 0.6%
of retirement. The model tends to overshoot that rate en, while δ = eu is adequately
chosen here. For the US, GW (2005) report monthly flows for the 25-54 population
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over the period 1995-2000. Translated into quarters, this amounts to 2.0% for eu flows
and 2.46 for en flows to which some 0.5% retirement rate should be added, i.e. 3% a
quarter. The calibration of the model is thus inaccurate in this dimension, a finding
already discussed in GW (2005). An improvement of the calibration for the US would
imply changing λ or addressing the infra-year transition rate.
C Specification tests
VAR specification tests
US Fra Ger Ita
Specification I: X = (p, u)0
Modulus of highest
root of charact. polynomial
0.915 0.911 0.869 0.954
Covariance matrix bεbε0 0.18 −0.05−0.05 0.75 0.04 −0.02−0.02 0.28 0.20 −0.01−0.01 0.37 0.32 −0.02−0.06 0.20
Portemanteau test of
residual corr. at lag 4/5(a )
8.57 / 9.51 7.45 / 11.9 4.82 / 5.59 13.3∗ / 22.2∗
Specification II: X = (pf , u)0
Restriction for Cup 0.964 0.922 0.798 0.888
Covariance matrix bεbε0 0.21 −0.04−0.04 0.73 0.03 0.020.02 0.27 0.27 2.10−32.10−3 0.38 0.47 −0.02−0.02 0.47
Portemanteau test of
residual corr. at lag 4/5(a )
12.4∗/13.3 10.8∗/18.2∗ 9.25/11.1 13.3∗ / 23.3∗
( a ) : Q -va lu e (χ2 ( 4 ) a n d χ2 2 ( 8 ) r e s p . ) ; * a t t h e 5% le v e l .
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Appendix. Position of the inverse roots of the AR characteristic polynomial,
specification I.
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